At first glance, one might place Chaim Perelman
firmly with Richard Weaver as a conservative philosopher/rhetorician, with
all the postmodernity of a George Will. Perelman’s major work was born, by
his own admission, in a ten-year search for a “logic of values,” a way of
debating values from firm premises and in such a way that the conclusions
would be reachable by reasoned argument. The concern for values underlies
most of Perelman’s work, in fact - he constantly returns to the theme, talking
about ranking values according to quality, setting up “hierarchies” of values,
and so forth. The concern for hierarchies crops up repeatedly - “The worth
of an argumentation is not measured solely by its efficacy but also by the
quality of the audience at which it is aimed,” says Perelman. None of this
appears to be very postmodern in outlook.
Such a reading of Perelman is very quickly
problematized as one reads further. For Perelman, the audience was of the
utmost importance - not in a simple Aristotelian sense, but as an active
participant in the rhetorical process. “Argumentation, unlike demonstration,
presupposes a meeting of minds,” he writes. Like Kenneth Burke, Perelman
feels that audience identification and cooperation are key parts of any
rhetorical act.
Further, Perelman expressly rejects the idea of a single,
objective Truth to which the rhetor can resort in convincing an audience.
If there would be such a Truth, he states, then all argument becomes simple,
formal demonstration, provable by logic. Instead, “we must recognize that
the appeal to reason must be identified not as an appeal to a single truth
but instead as an appeal for the adherence of an audience.” This begins to
open up issues that later writers such as Pat Bizzell addressed in working
on theories of discourse communities. Perelman early on recognized that what
any group of people accepts as true will vary from community to community,
and that those accepted truths are to some extent created by the community
- a very postmodern notion.
Subjectivity is another fixture in postmodern theory;
a common idea is that every act of speech is “political” and subjective,
whether consciously or unconsciously so. Here as well Perelman seems more
postmodern than traditional. “Although his judgment may appear more balanced,
it cannot achieve perfect objectivity - which can only be an ideal.” Perelman
goes on to say that even science, frequently viewed as the most objective
form of discourse, can never be free of subjective viewpoint.
So what then are we to make of Perelman’s position?
Accepting of hierarchies on the one hand, but claiming a social constructivist
view on the other, he certainly defies easy categorization - not a bad thing.
I would like to suggest that, though Perelman in many ways preceded current
postmodern thought, in many ways he transcends it. Like Toulmin, Perelman
was looking for a middle road, a balance of firm standards and the flexibility
of relativism. The problem with extreme relativism is that it can quickly
lead to a sort of “critical paralysis,” in which one can critique other positions
with great conviction, but is barred by one’s own theory from offering any
sort of firm plan or solution. I feel Perelman would have little patience
with a theory of argument that did not lead to eventual action; his primary
study, after all, was legal argument, which must in the end provide a decision
or resolution. Toulmin’s solution was a sort of informed casuistry, in which
one can have ideals and values, but through study of individual cases apply
those values flexibly. Perelman’s solution seems to lie in a melding of audience
consideration with another kind of casuistry. He took a “bottom-up” approach,
like Toulmin, in studying judicial discourse on a case by case basis to find
out what underlied their decisions. He also believes in studying the beliefs
and values of a given discourse group, including the importance they assign
to their various values, in order to fully appreciate how to write to those
groups. In other words, he recognizes that hierarchies can and will exist,
but that those value-hierarchies are socially constructed and will vary from
group to group. A debate over values might, in Perelman’s system, be a debate
on the reordering of those values, or whether to admit a new value into the
system, or possibly toss out an existing one. This approach, I think, helps
find a way past the swamp of complete relativism while still taking into
account the variations between discourse communities and their standards.
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